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THESIS ABSTRACT 
The argument from design is one of the most widely debated arguments 
for the existence of God. There has been much written in support of and in 
criticism of the argument's basic structure and conclusion. I shall attempt to 
clarify these positions, and to argue that the thei?ti c account provides a more 
rationally justified explanation of human life on earth than the atheistic 
account. 
Many philosophers think that any proof for the existence of God is mere 
"metaphysical speculation." Many times these philosophers use the criteria of 
scientific empiricism as the standard for an "acceptable" scientific theory, 
regardless of the subject matter. 
I shall formulate the argument from design as an empirical scientific 
theory according to the school of scientific falsificationism as stated by Karl 
Popper. 
The principal literature to be investigated in this study will be the most 
recent articles and texts which discuss relevant scientific data, and their 
philosophical implications for the argument from design. 
The results of this investigation demonstrate that it is possible to 
formulate an argument for the existence of God which meets all of the criteria 
of the falsificationists school of scientific empiricism. 
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INTRODUCTION 
St. Paul in his letter to the Romans states, "For since the creation of 
the world God's invisible qualities - his eternal power and divine nature -
have been clearly seen, being understood from what has been made, so that 
men are without excuse" (NIV. Romans 1: 20). Is this religious dogma or 
scientific fact? 
The argument from design, also ref erred to as the teleological 
argument, is one of the most widely debated arguments for the existence of 
God 1 • Much has been written in support of and in criticism of the argument's 
basic structure and conclusion. I shall attempt to clarify these _positions, and 
to argue that the theistic account provides a more rationally justified 
explanation of nat:ural order than the atheistic account. 
I shall begin by discussing the classical statements of the argument from 
design. The classical statements which will be discussed are those by Plato, 
Thomas Aquinas, and William Paley. This will give us a firm foundation upon 
which to proceed. 
I shall then discuss the critiques of the classical statements. The 
critiques of the classical statements of the argument from design which will be 
discussed are those by David Hume, Immanuel Kant, and Charles Darwin. This 
1 For recent discussion in a public forum see Bryan Appleyard, "Science 
had better watch its language," which appeared in the Providence Journal 
Bulletin, April 15, 1993; Robert Wright, "Science, God and Man," which 
appeared in Time, December 28, 1992. 
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discussion will expose the possible weaknesses of the classical statements. 
I then proceed to investigate the possibility of establishing the 
argument from design as a scientific theory . Finally, I shall assess how the 
scientific restatement of the argument from design responds to the critiques 
of the classical statements of the argument from design. 
For the purposes of formulating the argument from design as a scientific 
theory, I shall adopt the criterion established by Karl Popper. Popper was the 
leading exponent of scientific falsificationism. 2 I argue that the argument 
from design can be stated in such a way that it fulfills Popper's criterion of 
falsification . 
It is within the context of establishing the argument from design as a 
scientific theory that I hope to prove that the theistic account of instances of 
natural order is more reasonable than the atheistic account. 
2 For a similar discussion regarding The Cosmologial Argument see Galen 
A. Johnson, "Harshorne's Argument Against Empirical Evidence For 




THE CLASSICAL STATEMENTS 
Plato 
Th e earliest statement of the argument from design is found in Book X 
of Plato's Laws. In the context of discussing possible penalties for those who 
violate religious laws, the interlocutors, Cleinias and the Athenian Stranger, 
raise the question of how the existence of the gods might be proven to 
atheists. 
It is agreed by both Cleinias and the Athenian that before punishment 
under the law should be administered to these people, they have the right to 
question the basis of these laws which they are supposed to have violated, 
namely, the existence of the gods. Anticipating the questions of these people, 
the Athenian represents them as saying, 
Gentlemen of Athens, of Sparta, and of Crete, you are quite right . 
Some of us are indeed absolute atheists, whereas others do believe in 
such gods as you describe . So we demand of you what you yourselves 
demanded of the laws, that before you resort to threats and bullying, 
you should try to convince us by argument and cogent proofs that gods 
do exist, and that they are in fact above being seduced by gifts into 
turning a blind eye to injustice. (Plato 1970, 885-886). 
It is in response to this demand that we are given the first statement of 
the argument from design. Cleinias' response to his potential situation as 
expressed by the Athenian is that surely there is no difficulty in proving the 
existence of the gods. When the Athenian asks Cleinias to explicate this proof, 
Cleinias replies, 
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Well, just look at the earth and the sun and the stars and the u nivers e 
in general; look at the wonderful procession of th e seasons and its 
articulation into years and months! (Plato 1970, 886-887). 
Here we see Plato arguing that the undeniable fa ct of the existence of 
order in the heavens and in the world obviously proves th e existence of the 
gods. Plato continues his argument to conclude that all physical movements are 
finally dependent upon the motions of soul or mind and not due to either a 
natural mechanism or chance. Regarding the question of proving the existence 
of the gods, Plato concludes, 
Now consider all the stars and the moon and the years and months and 
all the seasons: what can we do except repeat the same story? A soul or 
souls - and perfectly virtuous souls at that - have been shown to be the 
cause of all these phenomena, and whether it is by their living presence 
in matter that they direct all the heavens or by some other means, we 
shall insist that these souls are gods . (Plato 1970 , 899 - 900). 
It is interesting to note here that Plato is employing the argument fr om 
design as a proof for the existence of the gods to counter a familiar atheistic 
argument. 
This familiar atheistic argument is that all things have come into 
existence by either nature or chance. Plato stating this argument says, 
They maintain that fire, water, earth, and air owe their existence to 
nature an d chance, and in no case to art, and that it is by means of 
these entirely inanimate substances that the secondary physical bodies 
- the earth, sun, moon, and stars - have been produc ed. These 
substances moved at random, each impelled b y virtue of its own 
inherent properties, which depended on various suitable amalgamations 
of hot and cold, dry and wet, soft and hard, and all other haphazard 
combinations that inevitably resulted when the opposites were mixed. 
This is the process to which all the heavens and everything that is in 
them owe their birth, and consequent establishment of the four seasons 
led to the appearance of all plants and living creatures. The cause of 
all this, they say, was neither intelligent planning, nor a deity, nor 
art, but - as we've explained - nature and chance. (Plato 1970, 
889- 890). 
For Plato, the world was unintelligible in terms of mechanical natural 
laws and chance. Order of the kind that was clearly observable in the heavens 
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could only originate through mind or soul. Plato did not accept the idea that 
matter could be self-ordering or self-moving. The world was to be viewed as 
an organism or a work of art. 
As we shall see, this t yp e of atheistic argument is still very much aliv e 
today. 
St. Thomas Aquinas 
The argument from design was also utilized 3 by the medieval 
philosopher, Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274). In his works entitled Summa 
Theologica (la, 2, 3) and Summa Contra Gentiles (1, 13), Aquinas offers his 
statement of the argument from design. These passages are relatively short 
and worth quoting in their entirety . In Summa Theologi ca, Aquinas says, 
The fifth way is based on the guidedness of nature. An orderedness of 
actions to an end is observed in all bodies obeying natural laws, even 
when they lack awareness. For their behavior hardly ever varies, and 
will practically always turn out well; which shows that they truly tend 
to a goal, and do not merely hit it by accident. Nothing however that 
lacks awareness tends to goal, except under the direction of someone 
with awareness and with understanding; the arrow, for example, 
requires an archer. Everything in nature, therefore, is directed to its 
goal by someone with understanding, and this we call "God" (Aquinas 
1964, 17). 
In Summa Contra Gentiles Aquinas says, 
Another proof, taken from the governance of things, is introduced by 
Damascene and mentioned by Averroes. Contrary and discordant 
elements, it runs, cannot always, or nearly always, work harmoniously 
together unless they be directed by something providing each and all 
with their tendencies to a definite end. Now in the universe we see 
things of diverse natures conspiring together in one scheme, not rarely 
or haphazardly, but approximately always or for the most part. There 
must be something, therefore, whose providence directs the universe 
(Aquinas 1956, 63). 
Here we see that, according to Aquinas, some things, such as natural 
3 See A. Kenny, The Five Ways. 
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bodies, act for an end despite the fact that these natural bodies have no 
knowledge or awareness. These different things co-operate in maintaining a 
stable order or system. It is not that these natural bodies intentionally act as 
human beings do with definite purposes in mind, but rather, that different 
kinds of things, such as earth and water, unconsciously co-operate in such 
a way that there is a stable order or system. F.C. Copleston, in his work 
entitled Aquinas says, 
And his argument is that this co-operation on the part of heterogeneous 
material things clearly points to the existence of an extrinsic intelligent 
author of this co-operation, who operates with an end in view. If 
Aquinas had lived in the days of the evolutionary hypothesis, he would 
doubtless have argued that this hypothesis supports rather than 
invalidates the conclusion of the argument. (Copleston 1963, 122). 
Aquinas held that this co-operation is demonstrated in ordinary 
experience. It should also be noted that Aquinas avoids sweeping 
generalizations . He does not say that all natural bodies always co-operate in 
an established world order, but approximately or for the most part. 
Aquinas has also framed this argument within the context of means end 
analysis. It is the observed means by which natural things realize certain 
ends. These means are activities of being which can only be explained in 
relation to an end not yet realized. Implied in this argument is the notion that 
means cannot be directed toward a specific end without an intelligent cause. 
Since we clearly observe inanimate objects directed toward specific ends, 
there must be an intelligence directing these objects. 
There are two implications of this argument as stated. The first is that 
all activities of being do not completely capture the essence of their end 
individually, or severally taken as separate individual constituents, but only 
as part of a greater whole. The second is that "agere est propter finem," 
activity is for an end . If all activity is for an end, then the end of the activity 
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can be vie wed as he reason for the activit y . Reas ons for act ivi t y pr esupp ose 
some sort of intelligence where the reas on resid es . 
William Paley 
Probabl y the best kn own statem ent of the argume n t of design was th at 
pu t for th by William Paley (1 743-1805) in hi s work entitled Natural Th eol ogy, 
or Evid en ces of the Existen ce and Attributes of t he Deity Colle ct ed from th e 
App earances of Nature p ublished in 1802. 4 In the first chapter of this work, 
Paley argues fr om a now famous analogy referred to as "T he Watch and th e 
Watchmaker." Here Paley argues that just as we would infer an intellig ent 
designer from our inspe ction of a watch accidentally found on the ground 
during a leisurely stroll, we are justified in inferring an in t elligent designe r 
from our inspection of the universe. As Paley says, 
In crossing a heath, suppose I pitch my foot against a stone, and wer e 
asked how the stone came to be there; I might possibly answ er, that , 
for anything I knew to the contrary, it had lain t here fore ver: nor 
would it perhaps be very easy to show the absurdit y of this answer. 
But suppose I had found a watch upon the ground and it should b e 
inquir ed how the watch happened to be in that place; I should hardly 
think of the answer which I had before gi v en, that, for anything I 
knew, the watch might have been always there. Yet why should not this 
answer serve for the watch as well as for the stone? For this reason, 
and for no other, viz . that, when we come to inspect the wat ch, we 
perceive (what we could not discover in the stone) that its several 
parts are framed and put together for a purpose, e .g. that t hey are so 
formed and adjusted as to produce motion, and that motion so regulated 
as to point out the hour of the day; that, if the different parts had 
been differently shaped from what they are, or placed after any other 
manner, or in any other order, than that in which they are placed, 
either no motion at all would have been carried on in the machine, or 
none which would hav e answered the use that is now served by it (Paley 
1856,5) . 
Pale y reasons that as the existence of order and purposefulness in a 
4 For other discussion of Paley's argument see Ric har d Swinburn, The 
Existence of God, pp. 133-136; John Hick, Arguments f the Existence of 
God, pp. 2-7. 
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watch is proof of an intelligent designer, so the manifest order and 
purposefulness in the universe is proof of an intelligent designer of the 
universe. Paley says that this inference is inevitable and justified. 
This mechanism being observed, the inference, we think, is inevitable, 
that the watch must have had a maker; that there must have existed, 
at some time, and at some place or other, an artificer or artificers who 
formed it for the purpose which we find it actually to answer; who 
comprehended its construction,.and designed its use (Paley 1956, 6). 
Louis Pojman in his work entitled Philosophy: The Quest For Truth, 
summarizes Paley's formulation as follows: 
1. Human artifacts are products of intelligent design
2. The universe resembles these human artifacts.
3. Therefore, (probably) the universe is a product of intelligent
design.
4. But the universe is much greater than a human artifact.
5. Therefore, the intelligent designer of the universe is much
greater than humans (Pojman 1992, 42).
At the end of Chapter 1, (Paley 1856, 6-8) Paley makes eight further 
assertions which he feels are justified. These assertions are: 
(1) The fact that we have not actually seen the watch being made
does not in itself deter the conclusion that it is in fact the result
of some sort of intelligent design. This conclusion seems to be
justified by the watch itself without further reference to
anything.
(2) The watch's failure to function exactly as designed or our
inability to determine all the correct functions of the individual
parts of the watch does not provide compelling evidence that the
watch is not the result of intelligent design.
(3) Our inability to determine the function of all the individual parts
of the watch would still not cast doubt upon the inference that
the watch had been made by a watchmaker.
8 
( 4) No one would accept as an adequate explanation for the existence 
of the watch, with its specific parts functioning for its 
determinate end, that it was the result of some possible 
combination of material forms simply because whatever one had 
found in place of the watch must have some material form. Here 
the explanation of the internal configuration of the watch is 
simply chance. The fact that all objects must possess some form 
does not adequately explain the existence of this parti cular form, 
especially in light of its ordered parts. Here it might be 
conjectured that Paley was responding to the criticisms of Hume 
published twenty-three years earlier in Hume's Dialogues 
Concerning Natural Religion. There is no direct evidence that 
Paley was directly familiar with Hume's work, but it would seem 
likely that he was aware of this criticism. 
(5) No one would accept as an answer for the existence of the watch 
the explanation that it was created by "a principle of order." 
Here Paley is referring to self-ordering matter which disposed 
the different parts of the watch into their present form and 
configuration. Again, Paley may be responding to Hume 's 
criticism. As Paley says, 
He never knew a watch made by the principle of order, nor can he even 
form to himself an idea of what is meant by a principle of order, distinct 
from the intelligence of the watchmaker (Paley 1856, 7). 
(6) Does not the fact that some sort of mechanism is demonstrable 
prove that in fact a designer exists, and not simply an 
imagination of a designer? 
(7) Attempting to explain the existence of the watch by means of 
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referring to the idea of "laws of metallic nature" or the like is 
based upon an incorrect understanding of the idea of "laws." All 
laws presuppose a law giver or agent. It is understood that any 
reference to laws implies that these laws were in fact created by 
an agent(s) for whatever ends these agent(s) were trying to 
accomplish. The expressions such as "the law of vegetable 
nature," or the law of nature" are colloquialisms and should not 
be misunderstood to refer to more than is proper. 
(8) Finally, no one would be satisfied by being told that because we
cannot understand everything and are not capable of
comprehending the totality of things, we understand nothing at
all about this matter with the watch. Clearly we know what we
know and ignorance on other things does not diminish this.
At the beginning of Chapter 3, entitled "Application of the Argument," 
Paley summarizes his argument very eloquently: 
Every indication of contrivance, every manifestation of de� "n, which 
exists in the watch, exists in the works of nature; with the difference, 
on the side of nature, of being greater and more, and that in a degree 
which exceeds all computation. I mean that the contrivances of nature 
surpass the contrivances of art, in the complexity, subtlety, and 
curiosity of the mechanism; and still more, if possible, do they go 
beyond them in number and variety; yet in a multitude of cases, are not 
less evidently mechanical, not less evidently contrivances, not less 
evidently accommodated to their end, or suited to their office, than are 
the most perfected productions of human ingenuity ... (Palev 1856, 13). 
Two other notable works which discuss the argument from design in 
great depth are the "Boyle Lectures" which were a series of lectures on 
Christian apologetics founded by a bequest from Robert Boyle (1627-1691), 
and the "Bridgewater Treatises on the Power, Wisdom, and Goodness of God 
as Manifest in the Creation" which includes 8 volumes written between 
1833-1840. 
10 
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the argument from 
design had come under ever increasing scrutiny, due in large part to a 
renewed interest in the criticisms of David Hume, Immanuel Kant, and Charles 
Darwin. I shall discuss these criticisms next. 
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CHAPTER 2 
CRITICISM OF THE ARGUMENT FROM DESIGN 
Introduction 
In this section, I shall discuss the three most influential criticisms of 
the argument from design. These three criticisms are those developed by 
David Hume (1711-1776), Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), and Charles Darwin 
(1809-1882). 
Hume's criticism is from his famous Dialogues Concerning Natural 
Religion, which was published posthumously in 1779. Immanuel Kant's Critique 
of Pure Reason, written in 1781, provides us with the second critique of the 
argument from design. Specifically Kant discusses the impossibility of such 
a proof for the existence of God in the second division, book 2, chapter 3, 
section 6 entitled "The Impossibility of the Physico-theological Proof." 
The final criticism of the argument from design which will be discussed 
is found in Charles Darwin's book entitled The Origin of the Species. In this 
work Darwin's theory of evolution provides the basis for the criticism of the 
design argument. 
It is only by careful study of the criticisms of the argument from design 
that·one can understand the weaknesses of the argument. Do these criticisms 
uncover an inherent weakness in the structure and claim of the proof for 
God's existence from the design of the universe, or are these weaknesses 
simply a result of particular formulations of an otherwise sound argument? 
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The Criticism of David Hume 
In his work entitled, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, the 
Scottish empiricist and skeptic David Hume states what has been referred to 
as the classical critique of the argument from design. 5
Hume wrote this work in dialogue form, modeled after Cicero's De 
Natura Deorum. It has been speculated that Hume employed this technique to 
conceal his true personal attitudes. As a respected member of the 
distinguished Edinburgh circle, Hume's devastating criticism of the most 
popular argument for the existence of God would have had grave effects upon 
his life style. Hume, in fact, finished this work at least fifteen years earlier, 
but was convinced by his close friends not to publish it then. They reasoned 
that even though he tried to mask his true opinion behind the characters in 
the dialogue, the repercussions would be most unpleasant. The Dialogues were 
published posthumously in 1779 by his nephew. 
The Dialogues have three characters: Cleanthes, who represents the 
natural theological position; Demea, who represents the orthodox position; 
and Philo, who represents the skeptical position. It is the character of Philo 
who, most scholars believe, voices Hume's true attitude on this subject. 
Hume's first criticism is that the comparison between the universe and 
human artifacts is unjustified. The similarity between these is not sufficient 
for the conclusion which the argument from design attempts to draw. Hume 
says, 
But whenever you depart, in the least, from the similarity of the cases, 
you diminish proportionably the evidence; and may at last bring to a 
very weak analogy, which is confessedly liable to error and uncertainty 
(Hume 1947, 144). 
5 See Alvin Plantinga, God and Other Minds, pp. 95-111; J.P. Moreland, 
Scaling the Secular City, pp. 62-67. 
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Although this is a direct criticism of the argument from design, it is a 
criticism which can be leveled at any form of argument which relies upon 
analogy as a basic proof. Analogies by their nature are not perfect. There are 
always some elements from each of the items being compared that do not 
correspond exactly to one another. This is the reason why the analogy is 
being used. Unfortunately, analogies are never strong enough as the basis for 
a proof. 
Just as Paley compared the universe to a watch, Hume's character Philo 
compares the universe to a house. Although there are indeed some similarities, 
Philo concludes by saying, 
The dissimilitude is so striking that the utmost you can here pretend to 
is a guess, a conjecture, a presumption concerning a similar cause; and 
how that pretension will be received in the world, I leave you to 
consider (Hume 1947, 144). 
Hume here is referring to the difference in species between Cleanthes' 
analogy of a house and the universe. Hume correctly points out that when we 
repeatedly experience a species of effect to proceed from a species of cause, 
we conclude "with the greatest certainty" (Hume p. 147) that our inference 
-is justified. But the justification for the inference is based upon the
experience of exactly the same kind of cause and effect relationships. I am
indeed justified in concluding that an architect or builder designed a certain
house that I might see precisely because I have experienced all previous
houses to have been designed by an architect or builder. The cause and the
effect in these instances are the same. The cause is the architect or builder
and the effect is a house. This is not the case with the analogy between a
house and the universe. In this instance, both the causes, God and human
architects different. Philo says,
Unless the cases be exactly similar, they repose no perfect confidence 
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in applying their past observation to any particular phenomenon. Every 
alteration of circumstances occasions a doubt concerning the event; and 
it requi re s new experiments to prove certainly that the new 
circumstances are of no moment or importance (Hume 1947, 147). 
Hume also argues that it is the principle of repetition which justifies our 
belief in similar effects from similar causes within a species. Therefore, the 
more we experience this relationship, the more justified we will be in our 
belief. Philo says, 
When two species of objects have always been observed to be conjoined 
together, I can infer, by custom, the existence of one wherever I see 
the existence of the other; and this I call an argument from experience 
(Hume 1947, 149). 
Since it is by repetition that the inference is justified, one would have 
to experien ce many universes in order to be in a position to make a reasonable 
conjecture about the origin of our universe. This argument is reflected in 
Philo's words, 
But how this argument can have place where the objects, as in the 
present case, are single, individual, without parallel or specific 
resemblance, may be difficult to explain. And will any man tell me with 
serious countenance that an orderly universe must arise from some 
thought and art like human because we have experience of it? To 
ascertain this reasoning it were requisite that we had experiences of the 
origin of worlds; and it is not sufficient, surely, that we have seen 
ships and cities arise from human art and contrivance (Hume 1947, 
149). 
Another of Hume's criticisms of the teleological argument is the 
traditional argument against the inability of the inductive method to ascertain 
certain or necessary knowledge about the world. Hume argues that it is an 
illusion to think that investigation of any specific part of a lar ·ger whole is a 
sufficient foundation for judgements about the whole, especially the whale's 
origin. Hume says, 
But allowing that we were to take the operations of one part of nature 
upon another for the foundation of our judgment concerning the origin 
of the whole (which never can be admitted), yet why select so minute, 
so weak, so bounded a principle as the reason and design of animals is 
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found to be upon this planet? What peculiar privilege has this little 
agitation of the brain we call "thought", that we must thus make it the 
model of the whole universe? Our partiality in our own favor does 
indeed present it on all occasions: But sound philosophy ought 
carefully to guard against so natural an illusion (Hume 1947, 148). 
We also see Hume point out that because we are automatically prejudiced 
to think that human reason is the perfect model of how the universe works, we 
should be on our guard against this. 
According to Hume, if we are to conjecture anything about the whole of 
the universe from the small part that we happen to inhabit, we should think 
the whole is extreme ly diverse in composition and not simply similar to a copy 
of the earth. Hume says, 
When nature has so extremely diversified her manner of operation in 
this small globe, can we imagine that she incessantly copies herself 
throughout so immense a universe? ... Nature, we find, even from our 
limited experience, possesses an infinite number of springs and 
principles which incessantly discover themselves on every change of 
her position and situation (Hume 1947, 148). 
Hume also points out that even if one were to grant the argument from 
design its premises which state that the universe is analogous to human 
artifacts, one could not logically conclude that the designer of the universe 
had any cla im to infinite qualities because the effect is not sufficient to justify 
such a description of the cause . 
First, by this method of reasoning you renounce all claim to infinity in 
any of the attributes of the Deity. For, as the cause ought to be 
proporti oned to the effect, and the effect, so far as it falls under our 
cognization, is not infinite; what pretensions have we, upon your 
suppositions, to ascribe that attribute to the divine Being? You will still 
insist, that by removing him so much from all similarity to human 
creatures, we give in to the most arbitrary hypothesis, and at the same 
time weaken all proofs of his existence (Hume 1947, 166). 
A further criticism made by Hume is that again, even if the premises 
stated by the argument from design are granted, the desired conclusion of 
only one designer is no more probable than the conclusion that the universe 
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was designed by several designers . Are not many human artifac t s the result 
of the efforts of several individuals ? As Philo says, 
And what shadow of an argument can you produce from your hypothesis 
to prove the unity of the Deity ? A great numb er of men join in building 
a house or ship, in rearing a city, in framing a commonwealth; why may 
not sev eral deities combine in contriving and framing a world ? (Hume 
1947 , 167). 
But it is not Hume 's intention to grant the proponents of the argument 
from design their st at ed premises . Hume can grant that our part of the 
universe does exhibit instances of order, as the theist says , but the larger 
problem which must be addressed by the proponent of this argument is how 
to account for the disor der and the "many inexplicable difficulties in the 
works of nature " (Hume, 167) . Alvi n Plantinga, in his work entitled God and 
Other Minds , argues that in this criticism Hume is referring to the problem of 
evil in the world and the inability of the argument from design to support 
empirically premises which logically conclude the omniscient, omnipotent, and 
omnibenevolen t attr ibutes of God (Plantinga, 108-111). Hume acknowledges 
that if we argue on a priori grounds, (ontological argument) to these further 
attributes of God, then these limitations can be accounted for . 
Finally , Hume does not think it is enough for the proponents of the 
argument from design to demonstrate instances of order as proof for their 
conclusions. Rather, as John Hick states in his work entitled Arguments for 
the Existence of God, 
In other words, it is not sufficient, as warrant for an inference from 
the world to God, to show that the world is an orderly and 
self-sustaining system. It must also be shown that this order could not 
have come about except by divine activity (Hick 1971, 10). 
According to Hume, this is exactly what cannot be done. He considers 
such an attempt to be begging the question because perhaps matter is 
self-ordering. Hume says: 
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To say that all this order in animals and vegetables proceeds ultimately 
from design is begging the question; nor can that great point be 
ascertained otherwise than by proving a priori, both that order is, from 
its nature, inseparably attached to thought, and that it can never, of 
itself, or from original unknown principle, belong to matter ( Hume 
1947, 179). 
A further conjecture that Hume voices is one which will later be echoed 
by Nietzsche's idea of recurrence. Given a finite amount of matter and an 
infinite amount of time, all possible combinations of matter will not only occur 
as simply the result of probability, but occur an infinite number of times. 
Instead of supposing matter infinite, as Epicurus did; let us suppose 
it finite. A finite number of particles is only susceptible of finite 
transpositions: And it must happen, in an eternal duration, that every 
possible order or position must be tried an infinite number of times. 
This world, therefore, with all its events, even the most minute, has 
before been produced and destroyed, and will again be produced and 
destroyed, without any bounds and limitations. No one, who has a 
concepti on of the powers of infinite, in comparison of finite, will ever 
scruple this determination (Hume 1947, 182). 
The Criticism of Immanuel Kant. 
Immanuel Kant discusses his critique of the teleological argument in his 
work The Critique of Pure Reason in the section entitled "The Impossibility 
of the Physico-Theological Proof. " 
Kant is attempting to determine if it is possible that 
[a] determinate experience, the experience of the things of the present 
world, and the constitution and order of these, does not provide the 
basis of a proof which may help us to attain to an assured conviction of 
a supreme being (Kant 1965, 518). 
Kant does not think it possible that the transcendental (universal and 
necessary) idea of a necessary and all-sufficient original being can be derived 
from a pure empirical investigation. According to Kant, the idea is so 
overwhelmingly great that nothing in our immediate experience can ever 
supply the necessary link to such a concept. 
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Kant asks whether, if we try to derive the concept of this being by 
postulating that this being is itself part of the world, would it not have to be 
contingent upon other beings as all beings in this world are. We do not have 
any experience in this world of any other type of beings. Therefore, if we 
hold that this supreme being exists in this great continuum of being, then 
experience shows that contingency must be part of its nature. If we try to 
postulate that this supreme being is not part of this world, but separate from 
it, what determinate experience can we look to for evidence in favor of this? 
As Kant says, 
For all laws governing the transition from effects to causes, all 
synthesis and extension of our knowledge, refer to nothing but possible 
experience, and therefore solely t o ob jects of the sensible world, and 
apart from them can have no meaning whatsoever (Kant 1956, 519). 
Kant summarizes the chief points of the physico-theological proof as 
follows; 
( 1) Everywhere in the world we see evidence of order in accordance 
with a determinate purpose, carried out with great wisdom. The 
world displays great variety of content and is unlimited in 
extent. 
(2) The purposive order is not intrinsic to the things of the world 
but only belongs to them contingently, having this purposive 
order imparted to them by an ordering rational principle in 
conformity with underlying ideas. 
(3) Therefore there exists an intelligent cause that works through 
freedom. 
( 4) The unity of this cause may be inferred from the unity of the 
reciprocal relations existing between the parts of the world as 
members of an artfully arranged structure inferred with 
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certainty in so far as our observation suffices for its 
verification, and beyond these limits with probability, in 
accordance with prin ciples of analogy (Kant 1956, 512). 
Kant concludes that for the proponents of the argument the main 
infer ence from the unity of the world to that of an int elligent designer is, 
[inferred] with certaint y in so far as our observation suffices for its 
v erification, and beyond these limits with probability, in accordanc e 
with the principle of analogy ( Kant 1956, 521) . 
Kant points out that the most this argument can hope to prove is the 
contingency of the form of the world , not the contingency of the substance of 
the world. In other words, the determinate form that any particular substanc e 
of this world happens to possess at any one time may indeed be contingent 
upon some prior determination the substance happened to possess. But, to 
prove that the matt er of the world was contingent we would hav e to, 
demonstrate that the things in the world would not themselves be 
capable of such order and harmony, in accordance wit h universal laws, 
if they were not in their substance the product of supreme wisdom 
(Kant 1956, 522) . 
According to Kant , this would require a different basis of proof than 
that provided from analogy with human art which he thinks the teleological 
argument employs. Therefore, the most this argument can prove is that there 
is, 
an architect of the world who is always very much hampered by the 
adaptability of the material in which he works , not a creator of the 
world to whose idea everything is subject (Kant 1956, 522). 
Kant thinks that to prove the contingency of matter one would have to 
employ a transcendental argument by means of concepts which are above and 
beyond anything empirical to which the teleological argument is restricted to. 
One might argue that the cosmological argument is able to prove the 
contingency of matter . 
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Kant sees the inference from the determinate experiences of order and 
purposiveness of nature to that of an omnipotent, necessary and all-sufficient 
being as employing concepts advancing beyond empirical grounds which the 
teleological argument deals. As he says, 
Now no one, I trust, will be so bold as to profess that he comprehends 
the relation of the magnitude of the world as he has observed it (alike 
as regards both extent and content) to omnipotence, of the world order 
to supreme wisdom, of the world unity to the absolute unity of its 
Author, etc. Physico-theology is therefore unable to give any 
determinate concept of the supreme cause of the world, and cannot 
therefore serve as the foundation of a theology which is itself in turn 
to form the basis of religion (Kant 1956, 523). 
Kant states that this proof always deserves respect because it is the 
oldest, clearest and most appealing proof for the existence of God that 
mankind has reasoned. Although he holds this proof in high regard, he thinks 
that it is impossible to prove the existence of God on empirical grounds alone . 
In order to achieve what the theist wants, Kant says that one must ultimately 
employ means beyond those available to a strictly empirical proof. He says, 
The physico-theological argument can indeed lead us to the point of 
admiring the greatness, wisdom, power, etc., of the Author of the 
world, but can take us no further. Accordingly, we then abandon the 
argument from empirical grounds of proof, and fall back upon the 
contingency which, in the first steps of the argument, we had inferred 
from order and purposiveness of the world. With this contingency as 
our sole premiss (sic), we then advance, by means of transcendental 
concepts al one, to the existence of an absolutely necessary being, and 
(as a final step) from the concept of the absolute necessity of the first 
cause to the completely determinate or determinable concept of that 
necessary being, namely, to the concept of an all-embracing reality 
(Kant 1956, 523). 
Charles Darwin and the Theory of Evolution 
In the latter half of the 19th century, the argument from design came 
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under increasing attack from the proponents of the theory of evolution. 6 
Although the idea of evolution did not originate with Dar win, there having 
been evolutionary theories since early Indian and Greek times, Darwin was the 
first to present a clear p roo f for the explanation of how evolution actually 
worked. According to Darwin 's doctrine of natural selection, the great 
variation in and among species type is not due to some act of special creation 
or supernatu r al intervention, but by the generational descent of modified 
species better adapted to changing environmental conditions. As species die 
off, the more suitably adapted species reproduce and survive. In his work 
entitled, The Origin of Species, Darwin says, 
Owing to this struggle for life, any variation, however slight and from 
whatever cause proceeding, if it be in any degree profitable to an 
individual of any species, in its infinitely complex relations to other 
organic beings and to external nature, will tend to the preservation of 
that individual, and will generally be inherited by its offspring. 
(Darwin 1988, 114). 
Inspired by the five - year voyage on the Beagle (1831-1836), Darwin 
was convinced that natural selection was the only explanation for the variation 
in species. In conjunction with sexual selection and the inheritance of 
acquired characteristics, Darwin's doctrine of natural selection was able to 
account for the transmission of the required survival characteristic through 
generations. This was a superior explanation to those which tried to account 
for the mutation by means of spontaneous changes in the adult organism. 
Although the laws of inheritance were for the most part unknown in 
Darwin's time, there were a number of phenomena of inheritance that were 
known and Darwin used these as evidence for natural selection . It is a fact 
that although progeny resemble their parents, they are slightly varied in some 
6 See Kenneth V. Nelson, "Evolution and the Argument From Design," 
Religious Studies. Vol. 14, pp. 423-443. 
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degree. Darwin held that some of these variations are better survival 
adaptations. 
According to Darwin, nature was the product of blind chance and a 
blind struggle for survival. Man was a mutation, albeit intelligent, which 
struggled with other organisms for survival. It was the operation of natural 
selection upon random variation which launched the attacks upon the argument 
from design. These attacks are probably best summed up by Richard Dawkins 
in his book entitled The Blind Watchmaker when he says, 
All appearances to the contrary, the only watchmaker in nature is the 
blind forces of physics, albeit deployed in a very special way. A true 
watchmaker has foresight: he designs his cogs and springs, and plans 
their interconnections, with a future purpose in his mind's eye. Natural 
selection, the blind, unconscious, automatic process which Darwin 
discovered, and which we now know is the explanation for the existence 
and apparently purposeful form of all life, has no purpose in mind. It 
has no mind and no mind's eye. It does not plan for the future. It has 
no vision, no foresight, no sight at all. If it can be said to play the role 
of watchmaker, in nature, it is the blind watchmaker (Dawkins 1986, 
6). 
Natural selection rules out design in the following way: variations in 
offspring are either useful or not useful. (Darwin did say that evolution is not 
necessarily progressive). The only reason for the survival of one variation 
and the individual possessing it is that the alternative variation and individual 
possessing it are eliminated by the struggle for survival of the fittest. There 
is no reason beyond this brute fact of nature. 
In his book entitled Charles Darwin and the Problem of Creation, Neal 
Gillespie claims that it is generally agreed that Darwin's doctrine of natural 
selection effectively demolished William Paley's classical design argument for 
the existence of God. He says, 
By showing how blind and gradual adaption could counterfeit the 
apparently purposeful design that Paley, the Bridgewater writers, and 
others had seen in the contrivances of nature, Darwin deprived their 
argument of the analogical inference that the evident purpose to be seen 
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in the contrivances by which means and ends were related in nature was 
necessarily a function of mind ( Gillespie 1979, 83-84). 
Further evidence that the "contrivances" are not the result of design 
is the fact that not all variations promoted survival. Most mutations are 
harmful and cause death to their possessors. Unknown to Darwin, the ultimate 
source of genetic mutation is DNA, which is the genetic material. Due to its 
structure, the DNA molecule is intrinsically vulnerable. Spontaneous changes 
occur frequently and are considered to be random in that these mutations do 
not necessarily serve the animal's needs. Mary Maxwell, in her book entitled 
Human Evolution: A Philosophical Anthropology, makes an interesting point 
when she says that Darwin's case against teleology is strengthened when one 
consults the actual historical record which she thinks is merely the outcome 
of immense series of chances. She says, 
... we should see it against a whole inventory of other possible histories 
which could very well have taken place instead. I believe that part of 
the reason why we assume that there is a design in Nature is that we 
see only the final results, for example the aerodynamic perfection of the 
hummingbird, as mentioned earlier. But in fact evolution is messy. 
There were many blind alleys in phylogenetic history; indeed, the vast 
majority of species which evolved over time (some say 99 per cent) have 
become extinct. Furthermore, even the genes we carry today do not all 
seem to be used; it is not known what their function is (Maxwell 1970, 
41). 
The argument from evolution which is used against the argument from 
design is based upon the argument that the apparent design one sees in 
nature is really the result of random variations which spontaneously occur in 
nature. The variations which continue to exist are simply those which are 
more adapted to the ever changing environment. The proponents of this 
argument point to natural history as evidence. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE TELEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT REVISITED 
Introduction 
Many philosophers think that any argument for the existence of God is 
"mere metaphysical speculation." Many times these philosophers use the 
criteria of scientific empiricism as the standard for an "acceptable" scientific 
theory, regardless of the subject matter . While acknowledging Kuhn's work, 
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, and the insights it gives us regarding 
how the nature of scientific theories and paradigms change, it is still 
appropriate to ask whether any argument for the existence of God can be 
formulated in such a way so as to fulfill the currently acceptable criteria of 
scientific empiricism. I shall explore the possibility of formulating the 
argument from design as an empirical scientific theory . 
There are currently several schools of thought regarding the criteria of 
scientific empiricism. 7 Rudolf Carnap argued in Philosophical Foundations of 
Physics that scientific empiricism should proceed according to verificationists 
methodol ogy ( Chapter 2) . Imre Lakatos in his work entitled Criticism and the 
Growth of Knowledge discusses several schools of scientific methodology 
including conventionalism, sophisticated methodological falsificationism, and 
jus tif ica tionism ( Sect. 1 , 2 , and 3 of "Falsification and Methodology of 
7 For an anthology on this subject see the essays included in Janet A. 
Kourany, Scientific Knowledge, Part 3, "The Validation of Scientific 
Knowledge," pp. 112-227. 
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Scientific Research Programs"). 
One major school of thought regarding the criteria of scientific 
empiricism is that of falsificationism. Karl Popper was one of the leading 
exponents of falsificationism, and presented and defended that position in his 
works entitled Science: Conjectures and Refutation and The Logic of Scientific 
Discovery. For the purposes of this paper, I will adopt Popper's criteria of 
falsification. 
Revised Teleological Argument 
I shall consider a form of the argument from design which infers the 
existence of God from our experience of instances of natural order. I shall 
discuss the notion of natural order in greater detail later in this paper. I shall 
not count as instances of natural order those patterns which appear randomly 
in nature from time to time. 
Consider the following formulation of the argument from design in modus 
ponens argument form: 
(1) If there are instances of natural order (NO), then there is 
intelligent design of these instances of natural order (D). 
(2) There are instances of natural order (NO). 
(3) Therefore, (by modus ponens) there is intelligent design of 
these instances of natural order (D). 
The acceptance of the truth of the conclusion that there is intelligent 
design depends upon the strength of the evidence for the 
antecedent-consequent relation in premise (1) between natural order (NO) 
and the existence of a designer (D). The evidence for the truth of the 
antecedent, required for premise (2), is provided in section 3.4 and I shall 
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argue in se ction 3. 6 for the acceptance of the truth · of the 
antecedent-consequent relation. 
The Scientific Criterion 
Recall Popper's method of empirical falsification. According to Popper, 
for a claim to qualify as empirical, a minimal requirement is that there be some 
evidence from experience which would indicate the claim to be false. Popper 
writes in The Logic of Scientific Discovery, 
But I shall admit a system as empirical or scientific only if it is capable 
of being tested by experience. These considerations suggest that not 
the verifiability but the falsifiability of a system is to be taken as a 
criteria of demarcation. In other words: I shall not require of a 
scientific system that it shall be capable of being singled out, once and 
for all, in a positive sense; but I shall require that its logical form shall 
be su ch that it can be singled out, by means of empirical tests, in a 
negative sense: it must be possible for an empirical scientific system to 
be refuted by experience. (Popper 1959, 40-41). 
It is important to point out that Popper argued that what differentiated 
empirical science from pseudo-science was that the "objectivity" of scientific 
statements lay in the fact that they can be inter-subjectively tested. Popper 
says, 
Kant was perhaps the first to realize that the objectivity of scientific 
statements is closely connected with the construction of theories - with 
the use of hypotheses and universal statements. Only when certain 
events recur in accordance with rules or regularities, as in the case 
with repeatable experiments, can our observations be tested - in 
principle - by anyone. We do not take even our own observations quite 
seriously, or accept them as scientific observations, until we have 
repeated and tested them. Only by such repetitions can we convince 
ourselves that we are not dealing with a mere isolated "coincidence", 
but with events which, on account of their regularity and 
reproducibility, are in principle inter-subjectively testable (Popper 
1959,45). ~ 
It is clear that Popper defines an empirical test as a repeatable 
experiment under controlled conditions. The procedure is deductive. Singular 
statements, known as predictions, are deduced from the general theory and 
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are then tested. As Popper says, 
Next we seek a decision as regards these (and other) derived 
statements by comparing them with the results of practical applications 
and experiments. If this decision is positive, that is, if the singular 
conclusions turn out to be accepted, or verified, then the theory has, 
for the time being, passed its test: we have no reasons to discard it. 
But if the decision is negative, or in other words, if the conclusions 
have been falsified, then their falsification also falsifies the theory from 
which they were logically deduced (Popper 1959, 33). 
Although a theist would argue that the derived statements asserting 
instances of natural order fulfill this criterion, she might also object to the 
narrow and somewhat arbitrary nature of this criterion. Thomas Kuhn 
recognized this problem as well, but held that it was an inevitable condition 
for the existence of science. In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions he 
says, 
Ought we to conclude from the frequency with which such instrumental 
commitments prove misleading that science should abandon standard 
tests and standard instruments? Paradigm procedures and application 
are as necessary to science as paradigm laws and theories, and they 
have the same effects. Inevitably they restrict the phenomenological 
field assessable for scientific investigation at any given time (Kuhn 
1970, 60). 
Popper argued that empirical strict universal statements are falsifiable 
and cannot be verified, and empirical strict existential statements are 
verifiable and are not falsifiable. 8 Again Popper writes, 
Strict or pure statements, whether universal or existential, are not 
limited to space and time. They do not ref er to an individual, 
restricted, spatio-temporal region. This is the reason why strict 
existential statements are not falsifiable. We cannot search the whole 
world in order to establish that something does not exist, has never 
existed, and will never exist. It is for precisely the same reason that 
strict universal statements are not verifiable. Again, we cannot search 
the whole world in order to make sure that nothing exists which the law 
forbids. Nevertheless, both kinds of strict statements, strictly 
8 For further information on the formalization of universal and existential 
statements and logical derivations see Merrie Bergmann, James Moor and Jack 








existential and strictly universal, are in principle empirically decidable; 
each, however, in one way only: they are unilaterally decidable. 
Whenever it is found that something exists here or there, a strictly 
existential statement may be verified, or a universal one falsified 
(Popper 1959, 70). 
Popper argued that the only "acceptable" method for scientific 
empiricism to employ is that of modus tollens (denying the consequent) 
argument form. Popper says, 
Consequently it is possible by means of purely deductive inferences 
(with the he_lp of the modus tollens of classical logic) to argue from the 
truth of singular statements to the falsity of universal statements. Such 
an argument to the falsity of universal statements is the only strictly 
deductive kind of inference that proceeds, as it were, in the 'inductive 
direction'; that is, from singular to universal statements (Popper 1963, 
41). 
In this way, Popper tried to avoid the problem of induction which 
occurs when scientists employ the modus ponens form and commit the fallacy 
of affirming the consequent . 
Modern analysis of the problem of induction begins with Hume and his 
celebrated analysis of causation in his work entitled Enquiry Concerning the 
Human Understanding (Sec 5, Part 1). The problem of induction is that it is 
impossible to derive a universal statement from any number of existential 
statements. That is, no amount of specifically confirming instances can verify 
a universal law. For example, P (universal law) cannot be experimentally 
verified by particular instances of Q (P holding). The fallacy is shown as 
follows: 
(4) If P (universal law), then Q (particular instance).
(5) Q (particular instance of P holding).
(6) Therefore, P (universal law).
Thus Popper says in Conjectures and Refutations, "Every genuine test 




other words, only one instance of a weight not falling when dropped from a 
tower disconfirms the universal law of gravity, while no number of instances 
of a weight actually falling from a tower when dropped can confirm the 
universal law of gravity. Popper does allow for corroboration of universal laws 
based upon confirming instances. 
The argument from design as stated fulfills Popper's falsification 
criterion. All experiences of natural order may be taken as falsification of the 
negative hypothesis that a designer do_es not exist. In this case, the modus 
ponens argument may be translated via the rule of replacement known as 




If there is not intelligent design ( -D), then there are no 
instances of natural order (-NA). 
There are instances of natural order (NA). 
Therefore, (by modus tollens), there is intelligent design (D). 
The experience we have of instances of natural order falsifies God's 
non-existence . 
Instances of Natural Order 
The term "natural order" refers to instances in nature of repeating 
patterns. These repeating patterns exhibit uniformity, symmetry and 
predictability. 10 It is precisely because these instances of natural order are 
predictable and repeating that the theist argues they fulfill Popper's criterion 
of inter-subjectivity and can be verified. 
9 See Bergmann et al., The Logic Book, p. 189. 
10 See Moreland, Scaling the Secular City, p. 43-56; Swinburne, "The 
Argument From Design," Philosophy, Vol 43, 1968, pp. 199-212. 
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I would like to discuss three types of natural order which are evident 
in this world. The three types are spatial order, temporal order, and 
informational order. 
Spatial Order 
I shall refer to instances of spatial order as instances of co-presence 
and distinguish co-presence from co-incidence by repetition. Co-presence is 
characterized by the repeating arrangement of a certain structure. I shall 
discuss the instances of atomic co-presence and anatomical co-presence. 
The simplest and most striking example of co-present order is that of 
the atom. Every electron that revolves around its nucleus does not revolve at 
just any distance from the nucleus. These orbits or shells have specific 
energy levels and can only contain a certain number of electrons. When any 
atom has more electrons than a specific shell can hold, the additional electrons 
begin to fill up the next shell. The atomic orbits of all electrons for each of the 
specific elements are identically spatially ordered. The electronic structure 
of even the most complex atoms can be viewed as a succession of filled levels 
increasing in energy, with the outermost electrons primarily responsible for 
the chemical properties of the element. Niels Bohr won the Nobel Prize in 1922 
for this discovery. One of the basic ideas of quantum theory and quantum 
mechanics is that as these electrons jump from one shell or orbit to the next 
they move in discrete jumps exhibiting only a certain specific amount of 
energy. While studying blackbody radiation in 1900, Max Planck discovered 
that energy is absorbed and emitted in specific amounts. He called these 
amounts "quanta." In other words, these jumps from different orbits are not 
gradual but discrete. There is no in between position. The periodic table of 
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elements is based upon this spatial order. 11 
I distinguish the spatial order (co-presence) present in atomic 
structure from mere co-incidence by appeal to the universality of the 
structure. If this structure occurred only sparingly or at random, then there 
might be an argument for referring to these incidences as coincidences. But, 
this is not an acceptable explanation of the atomic structure because it is an 
identically repeated pattern for each specific element. 
Another instance of natural spatial order is that of the anatomical 
structure of animals and plants. The philosophers of the eighteenth century 
almost exclusively discussed this instance of co-presence. William Paley, in his 
work entitled Natural Theology, discussed the details of the anatomical 
structure of the eyes and ears and marveled at the minute precision which 
yielded high efficiency of operation. 
It is possible to formulate an argument from the instance of anatomical 
order which is immune to Darwin's criticisms. 12 Evolution can only occur 
given special natural laws. These laws include the chemical laws which sp~cify 
how under certain conditions organic molecules combine, and subsequently 
how these combine to make organisms. There are also biological laws of 
evolution which govern offspring and the transference of those characteristics 
which are advantageous for survival. Those organisms that survive will be so 
structured that they will be able to more easily adapt to the changing 
environment than competitors. These organisms will exhibit greater anatomical 
spatial order than their competitors. Under these circumstances, nature 
11 See Raymond A. Servay, Modern Physics, 11 Atomic Structure, 11 pp. 216-
241. 
12 See Swinburne, The Existence of God, pp. 134-136. 
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guarantees that these instances of spatial order cannot be co-incidental. 
Temporal Order 
The instances of natural temporal order in our world are even more 
obvious than those of spatial order. These instances of order refer to the 
simple patterns of non-conscious behavior of physical objects. The regularity 
of day and night, the changes of the seasons, the succession of growth in 
plants and animals are all examples of temporal order. Any example of a 
physical object acting in accordance with the laws of nature and the laws of 
physics, such as the laws of gravity and motion, provide experimentally 
testable evidence of temporal order. Richard Swinburne in his article entitled 
"The Argument from Design," says "Almost all regularities of succession are 
due to the normal operation of scientific laws" (Swinburne, 200). One need 
only look up in the sky to see examples of the predictable, uniform temporal 
paths that the heavenly bodies follow. The fact that we are able to predict any 
natural occurrence is evidence of temporal order. The universe could have 
naturally been chaotic. 
Kant's criticism notwithstanding, the idea that temporal order is the 
result of human beings imposing their order on an otherwise chaotic world can 
-':'I 
be countered by arguing that since human beings can discriminate between 
order and disorder, this discrimination must be in response to something 
independent of human beings. The argument from design holds that the 
temporal order in the world is independent of human being's recognition of it. 
As such, temporal order has been, is, and will continue to be regardless of 
any human being present to observe it. Temporal order is a basic feature of 
the structure universe. 
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There has been much discussion of the many interpretations and 
definitions of the anthropic principle. 13 In 1974, Brandon Carter coined the 
phrase in his book entitled Confrontation of Cosmological Theories with 
Observations (Carter 1974). Ess entially the anthropic principle refers to the 
self-evident and trivial fact that human beings can obser ve only a universe 
orderly enough to maintain human life. It is not my point to argue the validity 
of this principle. I would only like to provide a response to the p otential 
objections which might be raised by this principle. The mere fact that order 
is a necessary condition for human beings to observe the universe does not 
dismiss the existence of order as less extraordinary and less in need of 
explanation. True, there would need to be a certain amount of order for 
human being to exist, but there could be chaos outside the earth, so long as 
the planet earth was unaffected by it. As Richard Swinburne says in his book 
entitled The Existence of God, 
There is a great deal more order in the world than is necessary for the 
existence of humans. So men could still be around to comment on the 
fact even if the world were a much less orderly place than it is ... The 
Teleologist's starting point is not that we perceive order rather than 
disorder, but that order rather than disorder is there . (Swinburne 
1969, 136). 
Informational Order 
The final instance of natural order in our world that I would like to 
consider is that which I refer to as informational order or order exemplified 
as information. Donald M. MacKay 14 in his article entitled "The Wider Scope of 
13 See Ian Hacking, "The Inverse Gambler's Fallacy: the Argument From 
Design. The Anthropic Principle to Wheeler Universe"; John Leslie, 
"Observership in Cosmology: The Anthropic Principle"; Joseph M. Zycinski, 
"The Anthropic Principle and Teleological Interpretations of Nature." 
14 See J.P. Moreland, Scaling the Secular City, pp. 51-52. 
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Information Theory" said, 
Information theory, in the more general sense it has developed over the 
past forty years, is concerned with all processes in which the 
spatio-temporal form of one set of objects or events (at A) determines 
the form of another set (at B) without explicit regard for the energetics 
involved. These are situations in which we say that information flows 
from A to B. In the operational context, then, we can define information 
as that which determines form, in much the same way as force is defined 
in physics as that which produces acceleration (Machlup 1983, 486). 
Both energy and information are operationally defined by what they do. 
Mackay differentiates the two as follows, 
Whereas the work done by energy is physical in character, the work 
done by information is logical work. In talking about information, there 
is always a suppressed reference to a third party, since, as in the 
physical theory of relativity, we have to relate our definitions to an 
observer, actual or potential, before they become operationally precise" 
(Machlup 1983, 486). 
The relation between information and order is that the spatio-temporal 
sets must be ordered sets. The individual members of these sets are arranged 
in an ordered pattern which determine form. Whereas the formation of a 
snowflake, in which a simple structural pattern is repeated, involves high 
order but little information, the DNA and protein formation involve both high 
order and great information. 
One instance of natural informational order is genetic material. Carl 
Sagan in his book entitled The Dragons of Eden writes, 
But complexity can also be judged by the minimum information content 
in the organism's genetic material. A typical human chromosome has one 
very long DNA molecule wound into coils, so that the space it occupies 
is very much smaller than it would be if it were unraveled. This DNA 
molecule is composed of smaller building blocks, a little like the rungs 
and sides of a rope ladder. These blocks are called nucleotides and 
come in four varieties. The language of life, our hereditary 
information, is determined by the sequence of the four different sorts 
of nucleotides ... The genetic instruction of all the other taxa on Earth 
are written in the same language, with the same code book (Sagan 1977, 
23). 




material. Most introductory textbooks in modern genetics devote entire 
chapters to the topic. A typical example of this is seen in An Introduction To 
Modern Genetics by Donald Patt and Gail Patt. Chapter 4 of this book is 
entitled, "Transmission of Genetic Information" (Patt, 51-78) and is devoted 
entirely to the discussion of information transfer between genetic material. 
All books on genetics also make use of linguistic terms. In the 12th 
volume of Frontiers of Biology which is entitled "The Biological Code", editors 
A. Neuberger and E.L. Tatum make this point explicitly when they say, "A
sequence of nucleotides or amino acids in a nucleic acid or a protein is a text 
and the residues are letters. Reading is a general term for any process which 
uses the sequence information in one palmer to produce a defined sequence in 
another" (Neuberger, 7). 
How much information is contained in a single human chromosome if this 
information were written down in ordinary printed book fo�m in a modern 
human language? Carl Sagan in his book The Dragons of Eden addresses this 
question. To summarize Sagan's explanation: A single human chromosome 
contains twenty billion bits of information. Assuming that human language has 
no more than 64 individual characters (letters, numbers, and punctuation 
marks), and that it would take no more than 6 bits (6 questions) to determine 
any specific character, twenty billion bits are about equivalent to three 
billion characters. If we assume that there are 6 letters in the average word 
and 300 words on the average page of a book, and 500 pages in the average 
book, the information content of a single human chromosome would be roughly 
equivalent to 4000 five hundred page books. (Sagan 1977, 25). 
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Corroboration 
Let us recall the formulation of the argument from design in modus 
ponens argument form: 
(1) If there are instances of natural order (NO), then there is 
intelligent design of these instances of natural order (D). 
(2) There are instances of natural order (NO) 
(3) Therefore, there is intelligent design of these instances of 
natural order (D). 
We have seen that this argument, when restated in its modus tollens 
form, fulfills Popper's criterion of falsifiability and thus qualifies as a 
scientific theory . We now must shift our focus from falsifiability to 
corroboration. The question which we are now engaged in is that given that 
our theory in question has passed the test of falsifiability, to what degree, if 
any, can we accept it as representing the truth of the matter to which it offers 
explanation. 
According to Popper, if a hypothesis has survived continual and serious 
attempts to falsify it, then the hypothesis can be provisionally accepted. In 
The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Popper says, 
It should be noticed that a positive decision can only temporarily 
support the theory, for subsequent negative decisions may always 
overthrow it. So long as a theory withstands detailed and severe tests 
and is not superseded by another theory in the course of scientific 
progress, we may say that it has "proved its mettle" or that it is 
"corroborated" (Popper, 1959, 33) . 
After having rejected the verificationist ideas of Carnap and others 
because of the problem of induction, it is clear why Popper stresses the 
provisional nature of accepting any scientific theory . 
This having been said, Popper does offer some criteria by which we may 
speak of the degree of corroboration of a theory. It is not simply the number 
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of corroborating instances which determines the degree of corroboration, 
although this is taken into consideration, but the severity of the tests and the 
degree of testability of the theory in question. The degree of testability is 
directly proportional to the degree of falsifiability. Popper says, "In 
appraising the degree of corroboration of a theory we take into account its 
degree of falsifiability. A theory can be the better corroborated the better 
testable it is" (Popper 1959, 269). 
At no point does Popper equate corroboration with probability. In a 
letter to Carnap in 1939 after Carnap's translation of Popper's term "degree 
of corroboration" as "degree of confirmation" in his article "Testability and 
Meaning" which appeared in Philosophy of Science (Vol. 3, 1936), Popper 
expressed his displeasure because of the association of the idea of probability 
and verification with Carnap's translation. (Popper 1959, 251). 
In his essay entitled "The 'Corroboration' of Theories", Hilary Putnam 
addresses Popper's idea of corroboration. Putnam says, 
Although scientists, on Popper's view, do not make inductions, they do 
"corroborate" scientific theories. And although the statement that a 
theory is highly corroborated does not mean, according to Popper, that 
the theory may be accepted as true, or even .as approximately true, or 
even as probably approximately true, still, there is no doubt that most 
readers of Popper read his account of corroboration as an account of 
something like the verification of theories, in spite of his protests 
(Schilpp 1974, 223). 
Putnam points out that Popper's account of corroboration is not so 
different from the standard inductivist account of confirmation. Recall 
Popper's method of science. One is to derive certain basic statements 
(predictions) and experimentally test them. If the prediction is false, then the 
theory is falsified. If sufficiently many predictions are true and certain 
boundary conditions are met, then the theory is highly corroborated. Putnam 
says, "Popper does say that the 'surviving theory' is accepted - his account 
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is, therefore, an account of the logic of accepting theories" (Schilpp 1974, 
224). 
Inference to the Best Explanation 
The statement of the argument from design that we have been concerned 
with here is intended to show that belief in the existence of intelligent design 
is the most experimentally acceptable hypothesis which attempts to account for 
the instances of natural order in the world. At this point we need to 
investigate the logic of accepting theories. 
· Implicit in the spirit of the scientific method is the principle of 
sufficient reason. According to Gottfried Leibniz, the principle of sufficient 
reason holds for all truths, especially contingent truth, such as we have been 
concerned with here . Leibniz expressed this principle simply as, "There must 
be a sufficient reason for anything to exist, for any event to occur, for any 
truth to obtain". The argument from design relies upon this principle that 
there must be a sufficient reason which explains the instances of natural order 
in the world. 
In the case of competing hypotheses, appeal to the principle of 
sufficient reason will not resolve the dilemma. We need to appeal to another 
principle of reasoning, the inference to the best explanation. 
Although the formulation of the argument from design that we have been 
discussing is stated in deductive logical form, the truth of premise (1) is not 
derived through deduction. Premise ( 1) is not derived through induction 
either. We could never conclude that instances of natural order require 
intelligent design from analysis of any number of individual instances of 
natural order. This is not a problem because, as we have seen, if the truth 
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of premise (1) were arrived at through induction, we would be faced with the 
problem of induction. So how is the truth of premise (1) arrived at? I submit 
that the truth of premise (1) is arrived at through the principle known as 
"inference to the best explanation." 
We have establishe d the fact that there are many instances of natural 
order in the world. These ins tances of natural order are confirmed not only 
in our daily experiences, but also in the strictly controlled environment of 
scientific experimentation. We must now address the question of competing 
hypotheses because, as we have seen, in modus ponens argument form, the 
conclusion of the argument will deductively follow if premise (2) is accepted. 
Many times several different hypotheses claim to be the best explanation 
to some accepted set of observations. Under these circumstances, we employ 
the method of the inference to the best explanation in order to determine 
which of the competing hypotheses is in fact, the best explanation. 
What makes one hypothesis a better explanation than another? There are 
four criteria which logicians and scientists have traditionally cited in their 
attempt to clarify what makes one explanation of observed phenomena better 
than others. 15 These are: 
( 1) Do any of the competing hypotheses conflict with established 
background knowledge? 
(2) Is there more evidence supporting one hypothesis than the 
others? 
( 3) Is there less evidence against one than the others? 
(4) Which hypothesis is simpler? 
15 See Emmett Barcalow, Open Questions: An Introduction to Philosophy, 
Chapter 1, pp. 1-12 . 
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There are two major comp eting hypo th eses that are usuall y argu ed to 
b e better explanations for the existence of natural order in the world than 
intelligent design. These two hypotheses are: 
(10) If there are instances of natural order in the world, then these 
instances of natural order are the result of chan ce . 
(11) If there are instances of natural order in the world, then these 
instances of natural order are the result of self-ordering matter. 
I will now argue that the instances of natural order in the world are 
better explained by intelligent design than by either of these two competing 
hypotheses. 
Chance 
Regarding premise (10), there are several reasons which indicate the 
weakness in this explanation. 
First, recall the definition of order as repeating patterns exhibiting 
uniformity, symmetry and predictability . Premise (10) stands in contradiction 
with this definit ion of natural order. The Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
distinguishes chance events from other events "on the basis of whether or not 
men can predict their occurrence" (vol. 1, 73). The notion of an absolutely 
random pattern that predictably repeats is self-contradictory. 
Second, premise (10) conflicts with the established background 
knowledge of scientific laws based upon repeatable scientific experiments. 
Recall Popper's notion of inter-subjectivity. Chance explanations, by their 
very nature, could not possibly fulfill this requirement . There is no chance 
regarding Newton's law of motion (force = mass X acceleration). 






claimed, provide an explanation of chance. Recall that only universal 
statements fulfill Popper's criterion of falsifiability. Carl Hempel, in his book 
entitled Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy 
of Science writes, 
But the distinction between law-like statements of strictly universal 
form and those of probabilistic form pertains, not to the evidential 
support of the statements in question, but to the claims made by them: 
roughly speaking, the former attribute (truly or falsely) a certain 
characteristic to all members of a certain class; the latter, to a specific 
proportion of its members (Hempel 1948, 376-386). 
Regarding natural spatial order, the explanation of chance or 
co-incidence fails on two accounts. First, as I mentioned earlier when 
discussing atomic structure, there are instances of natural spatial order that 
are all-pervasive. No doubt chance arrangements of physical objects do occur 
in nature, but when these arrangements continually recur the explanation of 
chance fails because we are able to formulate laws and make predictions as to 
their recurrence. No doubt that by mere chance there could exist a lake such 
that there could be a row of trees around the lake that alternated in a pattern 
of maple, oak, and pine. Were we to come across such a lake with such an 
_arrangement of trees, one acceptable explanation could be that this 
arrangement occurred by mere chance. But if we continually observed similar 
lakes with a similar arrangement of trees around them, the explanation of 
chance would cease to be an acceptable explanation in light of other possible 
explanations, such as intelligent design. Therefore the explanation of chance 












Regarding premise (11), there is a major reason which indicates the 
weakness of this explanation. 
First, quantum physics has discovered that all elementary particles, 
atoms, and even molecules are identical. In his book entitled The Emperor's 
New Mind, Roger Penrose says, 
According to quantum mechanics, any two electrons must necessarily 
be completely identical, and the same holds for any two protons and for 
any two particles whatever, of any one particular kind. This is not 
merely to say that there is no way of telling the particles apart: the 
statement is considerably stronger than that. If an electron in a 
person's brain were to be exchanged with an electron in a brick, then 
the state of the system would be exactly the same as it was before, not 
merely indistinguishable from it. The same holds for protons and for 
any other kind of particle, and for whole atoms, molecules, etc. 
(Penrose 1989, 25). 
The significance of this is clear. If all elementary particles of atoms and 
molecules are identical in kind, how does premise (11) explain the fact that 
some of these elementary particles become orderful patterns, i.e. atoms and 
molecules, and some do not? Quantum physics does not recognize order and 
disorder as intrinsic properties of elementary particles. There is no 
recognized property in physics known as self-ordering matter. Clearly these 
unconscious entities do not possess the capability within themselves of 
creating order. If they did, then they would all be orderful. 
The objection might be raised regarding the previous discussion of 
spatial order in reference to atomic structure. It is true that atoms exhibit 
order, but there is no evidence that this order is due to some intrinsic 
property of the elementary constituents of the atoms. Therefore, premise ( 11) 
conflicts with established background knowledge. 
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Intelligent Design 
In contrast to premises (10) and (11), premise (1) of the argument from 
design does have supporting evidence which qualifies it as the best 
explanation. I shall now discuss this evidence. 
The strongest evidence a theist could provide in favor of intelligent 
design being the best explanation for the instances of natural order is that 
there is, in fact, a class of order which we know is the result of intelligent 
design, namely human order. Natural order and human order are not different 
in kind, but only origin. This is not an argument from analogy. The theist is 
not saying that human order and natural order are merely similar or resemble 
one another. The theist can make the stronger claim that natural order and 
human order are identical in kind, but only differ in origin. 
There are many examples of spatial human order. Books arranged in a 
library, streets arranged in a city, and even traffic lights are instances of 
spatial human order. Examples of temporal human order are any regularly 
scheduled event, such as train, bus or airline schedule. Music also is an 
example of temporal human order. Examples of informational human order are 
also numerous. Any human language or communication is an example. Street 
signs and books are examples of human informational order. The list goes on 
and on. All these instances of human order are the result of intelligent 
design. Therefore the inference to the explanation that instances of natural 
order are also the result of intelligent design at least has more corroborating 
evidence than the others we have discussed. 
What is important to notice about all instances of human order is that 
they all involved reference to some purpose or goal. Up to this point in the 
discussion I have purposely not introduced any notion whatsoever regarding 
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purpose or intention. 16 Regarding instances of human order, the elimination 
of purpose or intention is impossible. 
I agree that the introduction of specific motives and desires pertaining 
to the intelligent design of the universe does employ the argument from 
analogy, but not the general notion that some motivation, though we may 
never know specifically what it is, does play a part in the design of the 
universe. This does not violate the scientific nature of the explanation. Carl 
Hempel and Paul Oppenheim wrote in their work entitled Studies in the Logic 
of Explanation, "The determining motives and beliefs, therefore, have to be 
classified among the antecedent conditions of a motivational explanation, and 
there is no formal difference on this account between motivational and causal 
explanations" (Hempel 1948, 45). 
In conclusion, I submit that intelligent design is the best explanation 
for the instances of natural order in the universe. According to the criteria 
of inference to the best explanation, intelligent design (1) does not conflict 
with established background knowledge; (2) has more evidence supporting it; 
(3) has no evidence against it; (4) is simpler than any competing explanation. 
16 For further discussion of intention and the Design Argument see 




Response to the Classical Criticisms 
Given that intelligent design is the inference to the best explanation of 
natural order, how does this account of the argument respond to the classical 
criticisms of the argument from design ? 
Consider first Hume 's initial criticism that the comparison of the 
universe with human artifacts is unjustified because of the difference in 
species between the universe and human artifacts. We can see that our 
argument from natural order is not affected by this criticism . Although we can 
distinguish natural order from human order, when considering order qua 
order, both satisfy the conditions for being order and therefore can be 
considered of the same species. They only differ in origin. All instances of 
order require intelligent design. Therefore, the cause and effect relationship 
is of the same type . 
Since it is by repetition that any inference to a generalization is 
justified, and a generalization is needed to inf er back to particular instances , 
Hume said that one would have to experience many universes in order to make 
a reasonable conjecture about the origin of our universe . This is of course the 
problem of induction. This same idea is repeated by Hume when he speaks of 
the illusion in concluding anything about the whole from any specific part of 
the whole, and further when he argues against the inference that the designer 
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possesses infinite qualities. A similar point is discussed by Kant when he 
speaks of the impossibility of deriving a necessary and all-sufficient being 
from a pure empirical investigation. More recently we have seen this problem 
discussed in reference to verificationism. No scientific theories are immune to 
this criticism, including the competing explanations for natural order which 
we have considered. Given these states of affairs, we have seen that 
intelligent design is the best explanation of natural order. 
Is there any more that can be reasonably expected from applying 
scientific criteria in establishing the argument from design? I think the answer 
to this question is negative. I do think, however, that a theist could argue for 
a wider notion of acceptable evidence beyond that currently accepted by 
scientific strictures. It is precisely these types of situations which expose the 
narrow and arbitrary limiting nature of "acceptable" empirical evidence. 17 
If, for example, one were to consider as admissible other evidence for 
a creator and sustainer of the universe, such as personal religious experience 
or revelation, then there is a great deal more one could reasonably conjecture 
about the nature and origin of the intelligent design of the universe without 
having experienced many other universes as Hume suggests is necessary. We 
could conclude that if we desire to have our theory remain scientific, then we 
must accept this limitation, as must all scientific theories. 
Consider next Hume's criticism that even if the premises of the 
argument from design are granted, the conclusion of only one designer is no 
more probable than the conclusion of several designers. Again I think that the 
theist could argue that given the constraints of "acceptable" empirical 
17 See Peter A. Bertocci, Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, p. 
82-120, 322-346; Galen Johnson, "Hartshorne's Argument Against Empirical
Evidence For Necessary Existence: An Evaluation, pp. 180-187.
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evidence perhaps Hume is correct, but, given other arguments, such as an 
appeal to Occam's Razor, a theist could argue on grounds that there is only 
one designer. 
How does the revised argument from design account for the instances 
of disorder? The theist could argue that Hume's criticism to the effect that 
disorder counts against the perfection of the designer does not preclude the 
possibility of the co-existence of intelligent design and disorder. Since we do 
not know the purpose for the disorder, this does not rule out the perfection 
of the designer, so long as disorder serves a divine purpose. 
Hume considers the alternative explanations of natural order as the 
result of self-ordering matter or probability. As has been argued in section 
3. 6, these alternative hypotheses fail according to the criteria of inference to 
the best explanation. 
Regarding Kant's criticism that the most the argument from design could 
prove is the contingency of the form of the world, not the contingency of the 
substance of the world, I think that the theist would have to agree. But, as 
has been mentioned before, this is as much an indictment of scientific theories 
in general as it is the argument from design. 
Regarding Darwin's theory of evolution and the criticisms which it 
levels at the argument from design, I think that a theist could argue the 
following points. First, there is strong evidence that the theory of evolution 
does not fulfill Popper's requirement of falsification and therefore is not a 
scientific theory. 18 Thus far in its history, the proponents of the theory of 
evolution, when dealing with falsification instances, have chosen either to 
incorporate ad hoc hypotheses, which ultimately leads to a priorism, or ignore 
18 See Phillip E. Johnson, Darwin on Trial, pp: 145-154. 
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such instances until such time as suitable ad hoc hypotheses are found. But 
in the spirit of philosophical inquiry, I will address the notion of natural 
selection, even if it is couched in a pseudoscientific theory. 
Many have argued that the idea of natural selection has not destroyed 
the argument from design. In his article entitled "Did Darwin Destroy the 
Design Argument?" James A. Sadowsky provides an argument in which natural 
selection can be interpreted as evidence of intelligent design, 
With the arrival of man there is another use for unselected variations. 
Where the selection occurs directly or indirectly as the result of human 
choice, it is not up to God which variation gets selected. The provision 
of many variations each of which could survive in a different 
environment improves the possibility of survival for a species despite 
man's ability to produce a different environment from what was in the 
original program (Sadowsk 1988, 100). 
Because man has free will and therefore is not subject to the original 
environmental program, the greater the repertoire of potential variations, the 
greater the chance for survival given the freedom of human actions. 
When viewed in this manner, even the most potent criticism offered by 
the theory of evolution fails to render the argument from design impotent. 
As I argued in section 3. 4 .1, it is also possible to formulate an argument 
from instances of anatomical order which is immune to Darwin's criticisms. 
Intelligent Design and God 
What is the relationship between intelligent design of natural order and 
the God of theism? Within the confines of scientific empiricism any conclusions 
regarding this relationship must be tentative and minimal. Tentative because 
of the problem of induction and currently acceptable empirical evidence, and 
minimal because of the natural gulf between creator and creation. 
If we employ the method of analogy, we might conclude, on the basis of 
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the identity of all order, that the designer of natural order is like a human 
designer in some way. I stress "in some way" because we only have the 
instances of natural order to determine the similarities. The employment of 
analogy brings more problems than it solves. Beyond this, I shall not 
speculate. 
The other alternative, one which I have argued for, is to realize that 
the argument from design, as an empirical scientific theory concludes the most 
that can be concluded within such a paradigm. With this understanding we 
clearly see that these limitations are not intrinsic to the argument but the 
specific paradigm we have chosen. 
If we chose to include other types of evidence in addition to the 
currently acceptable empirical evidence as per scientific empiricism, then our 
conclusion will support the theist's position even better. 
This paper began by asking whether all arguments for the existence of 
God are "mere metaphysical speculation." In my attempt to argue that there 
is an argument for the existence of God which is not "mere metaphysical 
speculation," I have offered a reformulation of the argument from design such 
that it fulfills the criteria of one of the major schools of scientific empiricism, 
that of falsificationism. I therefore submit that not only is there a proof for 
the existence of God which is not "mere metaphysical speculation," but the 
stronger claim that St. Paul was correct in his letter to the Romans when he 
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